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Abstract 
Private financing and operations of public infrastructures – often also called Public-Private Partnerships 
or PPPs – are becoming increasingly important, especially in the case of developing countries. Different 
types of PPP instruments – among which in particular BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) and BOOT (Build-
Own-Operate-Transfer) instruments – have been tried and will be used in major infrastructure projects, 
ranging from dams, power plants, roads, and railways to telecommunications infrastructures and others 
more. Little however is known about critical success factors.  
In this paper, the authors will focus on BOTs for both thermal and hydraulic plants. Empirically the 
paper will be grounded on selected cases in Africa, as well as on World Bank data. More precisely, 
the authors will compare such BOTs and seek to identify the relevant success factors. It is generally 
admitted that BOTs work better in the case of thermal plants than in the case of hydraulic plants. It is 
assumed that this is mainly because, in the case of thermal plants, more limited initial investment is 
needed and therefore less financial and other risks (e.g., climate, geology) are being incurred. 
However, there is generally more uncertainty about fuel price evolution in the case of thermal plants. 
The paper will seek to determine which are the relevant criteria that influence the choice for BOTs in 
either thermal and hydraulic plants. We anticipate that such criteria pertain to the amount of kWh 
needed, the type of energy needed (e.g., continuous vs peak-load), oil price, regulatory factors (e.g., 
CO2 tax), and others more. Overall, it will appear that risk management is the key to successful BOTs. 
Therefore, in conclusion, the paper will make related recommendations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Infrastructures were mainly financed by the public sector in the past. But now, the public can’t find 
money anymore to continue the build up infrastructures. In their budget, they cancel first new investment 
before they cut off current costs. In addition, a lot of public sector failures didn’t improve the reputation 
of the public. 
At the time, for many countries, sector reforms, including public-private partnerships (PPP) in 
infrastructure, were seen as a way out of an apparently inescapable downward spiral. In the energy 
sector, PPP was expected for example to reduce power outages. PPP then seemed as a good 
alternative to a long history of public sector failures [1]. Public sector monopolies tended to be plagued 
by inefficiency and failed to expand services to meet rapidly growing demand. Many were strapped 
for resources because governments succumbed to populist pressures to hold prices below costs, 
notwithstanding that the beneficiaries of these subsidies were usually not the poor. Overstaffing and 
mismanagement, including the diversion of revenues by employees of these utilities, were common, and 
indeed still remains so under public provision. Consumers were often in the position of having to cope 
with shortages and lack of access by self-provision or buying expensive inferior substitutes to network 
access. The inability of public utilities to meet demand created black markets for connections. [2] 
Until the early 1990s or so, infrastructure industries – energy, ports, railways, roads, telecommunications 
and water & sewerage – were generally almost exclusively a public sector responsibility. This has 
changed. Private corporations – often not local – are now an actor in roughly 40-50% of the countries 
of the world in some key dimension of large-scale service delivery – the average is somewhat higher 
for developed countries than for developing countries and for some sectors than for others. 
For developing and transition economies, there were at least three main drivers behind this 
transformation. The first was a change in ideology. The high profile of the, then, very atypical 1970s 
British and Chilean experiences with market oriented privatization, were the results of political reversals 
in these two countries. These real life laboratories of the competition cum privatization experiments 
eased the large-scale replications of the 1990s. British and Chilean experts traveled the world during 
the 1980s “selling” their experiences to curious audiences from Africa, Latin America, Asia and later 
Eastern Europe. At this point, it has to be said that 90% of future plants will be in Asia, Africa and 
South America [3]. 
The second change engine was technological. The telecommunication revolution is well known and has 
been internalized in the most remote areas of the world. Not quite as spectacular as in telecoms, 
technological changes have however also reached almost all other sectors in poor countries. From more 
cost effective small water systems to spectacularly performing low cost small-scale solar generators, 
technological progress is slowly but surely changing the market structure in energy service delivery in 
developing countries.  
The third engine of reform is the fiscal crisis of the 1980s to the mid-1990s in most developing and 
transition economies. Governments could no longer afford the high costs of the historically high 
inefficiency levels and of the resulting subsidy demands of the sector. Moreover, governments had long 
stopped significant investment in the sector. [4] 
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There are four principal roles for the private sector in PPP schemes [5]: 
• to provide additional capital; 
• to provide alternative management and implementation skills; 
• to provide value added to the consumer and the public at large; 
• to provide better identification of needs and optimal use of resources. 
The advantages of PPP are [6, 7]: 
• enhance government’s capacity to develop integrated solutions 
• facilitate creative and innovative approaches 
• reduce the cost to implement the project 
• reduce the time to implement the project 
• transfer certain risks to the private project partner and better risk allocation 
• acceleration of infrastructure provision 
• reduce whole life costs 
• better incentives to perform 
• generation of additional revenues 
• enhanced public management 
However, while PPPs can present a number of advantages, it must be remembered that these schemes 
are also complex to design, implement and manage. They are by no means the only or the preferred 
option and should only be considered if it can be demonstrated that they will achieve additional value 
compared with other approaches, if there is an effective implementation structure and if the objectives 
of all parties can be met within the partnership. [8] 
A few guidelines to help [9]: 
• A multitude of PPP structures exist and must be selected according to project type, needs and sector. 
There is no single perfect model. 
• Each type of PPP has inherent strengths and weaknesses which need to be recognized and 
integrated into project design. 
• Each partner to a PPP has responsibilities. The Public sector must transform its role from a service 
provider to manager / monitor of private contractors. 
The overall aim of PPPs is therefore to structure the relationship between the parties, so that risks are 
borne by those best able to control them and increased value is achieved through the exploitation of 
private sector skills and competencies. 
Different types of contract 
There are a lot of different contracts in the PPP. The following figure shows the relationship between 
ownership and management in the different contracts: 
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 The different contracts – ownership and management aspects [10]. 
A few explanations to the different types of contracts [11]: 
• The Service Contract is an institutional arrangement whereby a private company is contracted to 
provide a clearly defined technical task (i.e. a mains rehabilitation exercise, design engineering) or 
administrative task (i.e. payment collection) for the public sector. 
• The Management Contract is an institutional arrangement whereby a private company is contracted 
to take over core operations and maintenance responsibilities within a production unit. The customers 
remain legally clients of the public sector. This contract is to boost senior capability and introduce 
new concepts. 
• The Lease contract is an institutional arrangement whereby, as in the case of the management 
contract, the private company is awarded a contract to undertake the core operations and 
maintenance responsibilities of a public entity. But unlike in the case of management contract, the 
leaseholder assumes the legal responsibility for operating the service in exchange for payments for 
the use of the fixes assets. Customers become clients of the private company. The company does not 
have responsibility for debt servicing and financing new investment. 
• The Concession contract is an institutional arrangement that has all the characteristics of the lease 
contract, but with the significant addition that the concessionaire also finances a detailed investment 
program for expansion and/or rehabilitation of the system. This contract transfer full commercial 
and technical responsibility to the private sector and, in addition, transfers responsibility for 
obtaining capital funds. 
Capital funds for infrastructure components such as plants can also be obtained under arrangements 
such as: 
• The Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) contract is an increasingly common institutional arrangement 
used to finance infrastructure projects. Under this arrangement the private promoter is required to 
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design and finance the investment project, to construct and commission the asset, to operate and 
maintain it to an agreed standard for the concession period (typically 25-30 years), and then to 
hand over the asset to the provider in good working order at the end of the concession term. Where 
the legislative framework permits, an alternative Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) contract may 
be used. 
• BOT-based developments have been realized in several developing countries as an intermediary 
scheme between public sector development and pure power generation business of the private 
sector. The BOT scheme is considered to be coordination of the roles between public and private 
sectors form the standpoint of risk sharing and attribution of assets. [12] 
For the last type of contract, there are many variation of it, not only the BOOT. The following table 
gives the whole terminology: 
Terminology. 
BOT Build, operate, transfer 
BOOT Build, own, operate, transfer 
BOTT Build, operate, train, transfer 
MFO Maintain, finance, operate 
ROT Rehabilitate, operate, transfer 
BROT Build, rehabilitate, operate, transfer 
DFBO Design, finance, build, operate 
Reverse BOT Gov. Declining finance of BOT 
To have a brief overview of the importance of the different contracts, the next table shows in percent 
the number of each type of contract in MLIC. 
Type of contract in Middle and Low-Income Countries (MLIC) [13]. 
Type of contract % 
Service Contract 35 % 
Management Contract 12 % 
Lease Contract 4 % 
ROT 2 % 
BOT 22 % 
Concession 19 % 
Other (mainly divestiture) 6 % 
A main difference between the different contracts is the duration time of the contract. Here a short 
overview: 
 Service Contract:   1-2 years 
 Management Contract:   3-5 years 
 Lease Contract:   10-12 years 
 BOT Contract:   20-30 years (operating period, one has to add the years for 
the  
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construction) 
 Concession Contract:  25-30 years 
Besides these types of contract, there are still other possibilities. One is outsourcing and the other a 
total privatization. Or the government doesn’t make contract with private, but instead liberalize the 
industry sector. 
2. CURRENT EVOLUTION 
There are different zones of maturity for PPP in the world, related under others to different 
organizational framework. A high maturity is found in North America, Europe and in the South of Latin 
America. A medium maturity is found in Central America, Turkey and India. Especially in Africa, the 
maturity has yet to be developed. There are still many regions in the world where the physical, social, 
environmental and economic conditions are favorable for hydropower projects. [14]  
On average, a smaller proportion of the developing countries are sharing the responsibility for service 
delivery in the network industries than in developed countries. In general also, it seems that among 
developing countries, the richest countries have been more systematic at engaging in reforms to attract 
the corporate private sector. [15] 
 
How present is the private sector in network industries? (Share of countries in tot. nbr. of countries. [15]). 
The overall message is usually quite positive for electricity, telecoms and most transport privatizations. 
There are more doubts on water privatization with a wide variety of experiences (for instance, see 
Estache and Rossi (2002)). Most of these papers however tend to focus on the ownership question. A 
few papers have now started to look at the impact of regulation on these efficiency measures. For 
developing countries, Estache and Rossi (2004a) show how the choice between price caps and rate of 
return matters as expected for efficiency and much more so than ownership in electricity distribution. 
[16] 
The main overall conclusion is that the record is quite mixed. While in general, the efficiency levels, 
quality and access rates have benefited from the reforms, these gains have been achieved at 
significantly higher fiscal costs and distributional costs than expected. 
Indeed, the PPP relationship meets the expectations of the sector specialists concern with efficiency but 
probably not the standards of macroeconomists concern with the fiscal costs of the sector and with the 
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interest groups committed to ensure that the interests of the poor are at the top of the short run agenda 
and not just on the long run agenda. [17] 
But in the case of Africa, and presumably in all LDC’s, there are more problems, which are the 
corruption, a worse quality because one has to slow down the prize for these poor regions, and the 
non-payment risk. There are organizational problems, too, like if in the electricity sector only the 
generation is privatized, but not the transport and distribution, the transport monopole can buy the 
produced electricity “for free”, because there is no other transport possibility. And it would be too 
expensive and ecological non-sense to duplicate the whole transport and distribution network. 
For the non-payment problem, there is the solution to work only with prepay like in the cell phone 
sector, which works in Africa. But for electricity, people always find ways to bypass the installed 
counters. 
It’s important to note that before the PPP, the public had the monopoly for the service in electricity 
(generation, transport and distribution). The state had a social goal to fulfill. With the change to PPP 
and the participation of private, the privates have an economic goal (maximize the profits). To avoid 
private monopoly which would bring a lot of social problems (to high prices of a service for example), 
the World Bank gives only loans if there is a competition. Mainly, the competition is for the market and 
not in the market. 
Because of economies of scale and scope and, in many developing countries because of the high 
commercial risks faced by private operators, limits to the achievable degree of competition in the 
market continued to prevail in some cases. In small countries, monopolies are indeed hard to avoid in 
water and energy distribution and in bigger countries, national monopolies are replaced by regional or 
local monopolies, but monopolies nonetheless. This is why competition for the market has become so 
popular during the 1990s.  
One of the assumptions implicit in this promise was that the number of potential providers in the sector 
would be large enough to allow competition for the market to be effective. This did not happen for all 
sectors. In Latin America for example, during the 1990s, 92% of the water and sanitation auctions, 
76% of the transport auctions and 57% of the energy auctions awarded had 3 or fewer bidders 
(Estache (2003)).  
The experience showed up that in the countries in which the energetic expansion has been based by 
economic principles “on the short term”, developed the capacities in the thermal power sector (on gas 
and coal) which have initial costs of capital lower and reduce terms of achievement than in the case of 
hydraulic. The developing on the short-term doesn’t take in consideration that after the period of the 
retrieval of the loan (12-15 years) the generated power in the hydraulic plants returns to 4-5 times 
lower price than of any comparable capacity from thermal. [18] 
Any private investor analyses on a short-term looking for an investments recovery as quick as possible, 
the developing of new capacities in hydraulic becomes possible only if exist the Power Purchase 
Agreement (PPA) and so, the private investor is isolated from the commercial risks. [18] 
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Financing 
The real value in a project financed this way (PPP) is not in the ownership of its assets, but in the right to 
receive cash flows from the project. The structure of financing power project largely can be 
categorized as follows [19]: 
• equity 
• debt- loans, bonds, debentures, etc. 
• net internal resources: retained profits plus depreciation less funds utilized for debt servicing and 
catering to the needs of additional working capital 
• others sources like leasing, hire purchase, deferred payments, etc. 
Private-sector project finance debt is provided from two main sources – commercial banks (82% of it in 
2001) and bond investors (insurance companies and pension funds) [20]. Public-sector project finance 
debt as subsidies. The local funds largely coming from Pension Funs, Insurance, Military Funds, etc. [21] 
Foreign loans are mainly bilateral and multilateral loans, grants and mixed credit, export credit and 
commercial borrowings. 
Lenders wish to have promoters with experience in the industry concerned and the ability to provide 
any technical or operating support required by to project; a reasonable amount of equity invested in 
the project; and interest in the long-term success of the project. 
The differences between bank loans and bonds are various, only a few are given here: 
Bank loans vs. Bonds [22]. 
Bank loans: 
- can be provided to any credit-worthy market 
- inflation-linked loans generally not available 
- Project Contracts kept confidential to a 
restricted number of banks 
 
- Banks exercise control over all changes to 
Project Contracts and impose tight controls on 
the Project Company 
- Banks tightly control the addition of any new 
debt and unlikely to agree the basis for this in 
advance 
- It is easier to negotiate with banks if the project 
gets into difficulty. 
- If a project gets into difficulty, negotiations with 
banks should remain private 
- Low penalties for prepayment 
Bonds: 
- only available in certain market 
- some markets can offer bonds with the inters 
rate linked to inflation 
- the terms of Project Contracts may have to be 
published in listing particulars prospectus 
- Bond investors only control matters that 
significantly affect their cash flow cover or 
security 
- It is generally easier to add a limited amount of 
new debt to bond financing as bond investors 
will agree the terms for this in advance 
- Bonds may be less flexible if major changes in 
terms are required 
- Negotiations with bond holders may be 
publicized 
- High penalties for prepayment 
The “PPP-World” is a fast changing world. Financial institutions should develop policies to make 
available soft loans and cheaper credits and should come out with innovative schemes for leasing, 
refinancing, Quasi debt instrument etc [23]. To keep the sustainable development view, more 
hydropower projects should be developed (the Bonn Renewables Ministerial Conference recognized 
hydropower as a renewable source of energy, regardless of the size of the power plant [24]). One 
way could be to allow hydraulic companies to issue lower inters rate bonds, giving guarantees to 
subscribe; to direct the government owned banks and financial institutions to allocate resources and 
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lend liberally to hydropower sector by treating it as a priority sector; and to offer higher return on 
equity to hydropower projects as compared to thermal power [25]. 
Additional, it could be that in a near future a global carbon tax will be introduced because of the 
political bargaining on charging CO2-emissions at the national level to reach Kyoto Protocol [26]. This 
would have a major impact on the thermal and puts the hydraulic in an advantage position. 
3. CASES 
Three cases from Africa are given in the next table. For each one figures the main technical and 
financial characteristics, as well as information about the type of contract and organisational issues. 
Because these are recent cases from which not all information can be publicised, there are no names 
and countries named. Three more cases on hydraulic plants are given in the annex, because there are 
less recent than the others. 
Cases [27]. 
 Case 1 (Thermal, diesel) Case 2 (Hydraulic) 
(run-of-river) 
Case 3 (Hydraulic) 
(run-of-river, with dam 
creating an reservoir of about 
400ha when full) 
Capacity (MW) 65 MW 60 MW 300 MW 
Production a year 
(GWh) 
420 GWh 190 GWh 2520 GWh 
Construction period 16 months 30 months 44 months 
Investment costs 68 Mio US$ 122 Mio US$ 513 Mio US$ 
Equity-debt 
distribution 
30% Equity, 70% loan 
agreement 
20 % Equity, 80% loan debt 
with planned 5% interest rate; 
pay back period of 15 years; 
IRR of investment of 9.75% 
and IRR of equity anticipated 
dividend insuring a 13% return 
on shareholder’s equity 
25 % Equity, 75% debt 
financing (25% equity 
required by the government); 
IRR of equity of 10.75 % 
Investment costs per 
MW installed 
1.05 Mio US$/MW 2.03 Mio US$/MW 1.71 Mio US$/MW 
OM costs a year 6.6 Mio US$ costs/year (plus 
contingencies, margins and 
taxes. The variable O&M costs 
would cover spare parts 
(39%), lubricating oil (32%), 
other non-fuel consumables 
(23%) and maintenance fuel 
(6%)) 
2.3 Mio US$/year 4.5 Mio US$/year 
OM costs per kWh 
produced a year 
0.016 US$/kWh 0.012 US$/kWh 0.002 US$/kWh 
Sold price 0.16 US$/kWh (average) 0.094 US$/kWh first 15 
years, then 0.090 
Sold 27.55 US$/kW/month, 
evaluated at 0.0280 
US$/kWh 
Energy buyer The energy is sold to national 
electricity distribution company 
through a PPA 
The energy is sold to “Energy 
of Country B” with a PPA and 
directly to large consumers 
such as gold mines, currently 
supplied by diesel generators. 
The energy is sold to State 
utility with a PPA 
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Type of contract BOT: The new IPP will be 
privately owned and operated 
and equipped with large 
Diesel motors burning heavy 
fuel oil (HFO), a low-cost 
process residue from the 
nearby oil refinery 
BOOT BOOT 
Duration of 
concession 
15 years 30 years (included the 
construction time) 
30 years 
Additional comments Environmental Impact Study of 
130 pages + annex. (noise, 
emissions, waste water, …) 
For each % equity more/less 
the price is 0.0014 US$ 
more/less. 
0.0098 US$ more for each 
year delay. 
Investors will be exempted 
from the income tax during the 
first 8 years and is allowed to 
re-export their benefits. 
The client pays the installed 
capacity and not the kWh. 
At the end of the PPA, the 
company will sell and convey 
all of its right, title and interest 
in the Power Station to the 
Government for the sum of 1 
US$ plus any overdue 
Capacity Payments, in 
accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the 
Implementation Agreement.  
Environmental impact study of 
over 200 pages. 
These cases show a clearly longer construction period for the hydraulic plants for a given capacity 
(Case 1 and 2). The investment costs are much higher for the hydraulic plants than for the thermal ones, 
too. It keeps the proportion of about 1:2. The interesting characteristic of investment costs per MW 
installed points really out that fact that the initial investment for hydraulic plants is more significant. On 
the other hand, the OM costs per kWh are much more deeper for the hydraulic. 
In all three cases, the energy is sold through a PPA (Power Purchase Agreement). Without it it isn’t 
possible for the promoter to handle the financial risk of non-payment. 
The duration of the concession diverse in a proportion of 1:2 again. The reason is that in the case of 
hydraulic one needs more time to pay back the initial investment. 
4. DECISION MODELS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
4.1 Decision models 
Today, simple models using Excel exist to help project manager to analysis projects mainly from a 
financial angle. Some of them can also be used to evaluate different types of investment determined 
by the type of contract (BOT, lease contract, ...), the duration of the concession, the participation of the 
public investors, the rate of interest and other financial criteria. For example, RETScreen developed 
from the “Natural Resources Canada” gives a brief overview on the technical and financial data and 
ratios [28]. Or the World Bank developed Infrisk, a program in Excel to evaluate only the financial 
part of a project. An engineer office may develop an own analysis model for specific project, helping 
them to decide which type of investment should be chosen and evaluate the own financial risk on the 
equity invested. One could also develop models for the comparison between thermal and hydraulic 
plants using technical, financial and organizational data and introducing different kinds of types of 
investment and different scenarios for future evolution. To start, one would introduce technical 
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requirements (capacity, continuous or peak-load energy, prize per kWh). An example of data is given 
in here below: 
Criteria in an analysis model for the comparison between thermal and hydraulic plants [29]. 
 
Quantitative 
 
 Hydraulic Thermal 
Technical 
 - capacity (MW) 
 - operation time 
 - numbers of turbines 
 - turbines efficiency 
 - losses  
(parasitic, transformer, 
generator) 
 - variation of flow - greenhouse gas 
 - type (reservoir,  
run-of-river) 
 
Financial 
 - Investment Costs 
 (feasibility study, development, engineering,  
 power system) 
 - Exploitation Costs 
 (O&M, fuel-cost, debt payments, taxes) 
 
Qualitatifs 
Organisationnel 
- legal framework (corruption) 
- non-payment 
- political acceptance of PPP  
  (expropriation, breach of contract) 
- opposition of population 
- type of contract (BOT) 
- power purchase agreement 
 
Environmental 
- oil price 
- impact on environment 
- war or civil disturbance 
- inflation 
- economic growth 
- exchange rates 
The analysis would be followed by a ponderation of the criteria and the result would be a comparison 
between a thermal and hydraulic plant. Recommendations would follow on type of investment, too.  
With the fast development of PPP and the markets which open to such contracts, new entries and 
smaller corporations may use such models to compensate their lack of experience. The experience is 
one of the important entry barriers to the “PPP industry”. It is this experience that enable actors to 
dominate the market and network the way to get the less risky projects. 
Such models may be of a great help for the risk management, too, because they can include modules 
for sensitivity and risk analysis [30]. 
4.2 Risk management 
The risk management is the key to the success in PPP. A risk is defined as any factor, event or influence 
that threatens the successful completion of a project in terms of time, cost or quality. A table is given in 
the annex. A key principle of PPPs is that risk should be allocated to the party best able to manage it. 
The effective allocation of risk has a direct financial impact on the project as it will result in lower 
overall project costs and will therefore provide enhanced value for money if compared to traditional 
procurement methods. 
All risks will be associated with a price premium. Therefore the objective must be to achieve cost 
effective risk transfer not simply risk allocation for its own sake. [31] 
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Revenue risk is the most fundamental of all unknown factors involved in PPP projects. Revenues flows 
are generally determined by two factors: utilization levels and tariffs. The availability of reliable 
historic information documenting demand and price elasticity levels varies among different sectors. 
However, the cost of providing electricity may well have been subsidized in the past, making it more 
difficult to determine how consumers would behave in the face of unsubsidized pricing. [31] 
There is some debate as to how much risk should be transferred from the public to the private sector. 
Generally, the more risk transferred to the private sector partner, the more financial reward the 
private partner will demand. Risk should be allocated to the party who can best assume it in the 
most cost effective manner. 
As said before, to attract private investment, the rewards must be commensurate with the risks. One 
measure of the potential rewards is the size of the market. Low per capita income and low or negative 
economic growth can make developing countries’s infrastructure markets appear small and unattractive 
to private investors in a world where competition for private investment in infrastructure is intensifying. 
In many cases, a key problem is insufficient information on how a market would respond to cost-
covering tariffs. There are also questions over the affordability of cost-covering infrastructure tariffs in 
developing countries, and of the cost implications of relying on private rather than public finance. And 
even if affordability is established, a long tradition of illegal connections and non-payment by 
government customers reduces the potential size of the market and introduces additional risks for 
potential investors. [32] 
Many of the special risks faced by potential investors in developing countries are due to a legacy of 
political instability and, in many cases, the weak credibility of government commitments. Risks are 
particularly acute in the infrastructure sector, where investments tend to be large and immobile, and 
where tariffs tend to be political like in the electricity sector. Additional non-commercial risks that may 
be particularly sensitive to investors in some developing countries include the risk associated with war or 
civil strife and the risk of expropriation [33].  
Two last general comments on risks: A common error in risk identification is to inadvertently duplicate 
risk. For example, the risk of failure to deliver a service may not be independent of other risks such as 
process design deficiency or of inadequate resourcing of skill levels. Risks may be inter-related and 
have a common result. [34] 
In a BOT contract the promoter takes most of the risks. He can try to transfer certain risks to other 
actors. The best way to do it is to integrate other actors in the ownership of the project, mainly the 
government (often 10-30% of the equity), the contractor, the operator and the customer. That way the 
risks are distributed upon different actors. Or he turns towards lease contract instead of contracts with 
a form of ownership (BOT, concession). 
An important point to mitigate the risks is the experience. The more experience the promoter has in PPP, 
the better he can manage the different risks and allocate it to other actors. This rises up the possibility 
to make profit. That leads us to the opportunity to make money as a private actor. 
The different variables to handle are: 
• transfer the risks 
• risk assessment of non-transferred risks 
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• insurances (interest rate, amount) 
• provision in case of a force majeure 
On the other hand, the government is in a weak position because he needs foreign capital. The 
bargaining power is low and that influence the risk assessment. The promoter will only sign the contract 
if the condition given by the government pleases him. The main risks stay at the government. The 
opportunity for the government is mainly to attract private capital for financing new infrastructure, 
renovate existing infrastructure or provide a required service. If the government hasn’t the capital 
himself (what in developing countries is often the case), he has to get it from elsewhere. The PPP are a 
valid solution. 
But it has to be said that the investors want today an interest rate of 20% to 30% what leads to more 
expensive projects. That’s why the state often has to take further loans, for example at the World Bank, 
and encumbers with debts more and more. Or there are hidden cross-subsidies from international 
actors. 
World Bank 
It’s necessary to make some comments on the World Bank because the play an important role as actors 
in the PPP. The World Bank takes almost no risk. They participate only with loans and would like that 
the private sector takes more risk. They would like to see them making concession contract and not lease 
contract. The lease contracts transfer commercial and technical responsibility and risks to the private 
sector. The concession contracts transfer full commercial and technical responsibility and risks to the 
private sector and, in addition, to transfer responsibility for obtaining capital funds. The ultimate 
objective is to secure private investment [35]. 
The World Bank plays a very important role in the administration reforms and the creating and 
ameliorating of the regulation. They help the government for the whole regulation issue. 
The main issue is not to maximize the profit, but to be able to manage the risks. One may even ask if 
this industry is a “risk industry”, in which the services provided don’t play as an important role, as how 
the risk management and assessment is done. Each actor will try to transfer the risks as much as possible 
to the other actors. But it has to be reminded, that each recognized risk has a financial value. The more 
risk the public transfer to the private contains, the higher the financial remunerations are. This offers 
new opportunities for the private sector. 
As shown in the next figure, the identification of risks should be followed by a search for solutions than 
can eliminate or mitigate these risks. If the risks are successfully eliminated, then there is nothing to 
evaluate. If, however, solutions are derived to counter these risks, then the cost implications of the 
mitigating solutions should be evaluated. The outcome of the evaluation should be fed back to the 
identification task to re-appraise the new risk profile of the project. Sometimes the mitigation of risks 
gives rise to secondary risks, which must in turn be addressed through identification-mitigation-
evaluation. [36] 
There is always the issue of probabilities to be considered. The iteration process of risk through 
identification-mitigation-evaluation continues until a satisfactory position s reached. The figure below 
shows that risks are still monitored and controlled, after they have been finally evaluated. [36] 
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 Illustration of the risk management process [37]. 
Because PPP contract are maid on a long period time, there an additional risks in comparison to shorter 
in time project, like the risks related to demographic change or legislation changes. 
While most forms of traditional privatisation include “transfer of risks” to on party, risk sharing between 
the public and the private sectors may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of privatisation [37]. 
But it has to be remembered that the allocation of project risks in BOT project is an art rather than a 
science, said Renton [38].  
The involvement of a large number of parties increases risks, since each party has different objectives. 
But risks sharing can be done better, on the other hand a risk of one party may have an impact on the 
other parties.  
Most large-scale infrastructure projects are financed using non- or limited recourse project financing, a 
form of debt financing in which lenders rely exclusively on the revenue stream generated by an 
infrastructure project as the source of loan repayment. Since lenders assume most of the risk in such 
projects, providing 70-75% of the capital costs in the form of debt financing, lenders have developed 
risk allocation requirements which must be met in any international project financing. The success of 
privately developed infrastructure project in Asia (and especially other developing countries) is 
therefore highly dependent on the ability of investors to meet the risk allocation requirements of 
international non-recourse lenders and to assure that legal commitments made in connection with their 
projects are upheld once funs are invested. [39] 
4.3 Risk profile of hydraulic and thermal BOT 
The risks peculiar to hydraulic and thermal power project can be classified into a development risk until 
the financial closure (risk only for the project company / promoter), construction completion risk (risk for 
the project company, lenders and the contractor) and operation risks (risk for the project company, 
lenders and OM contractor) based on the related timeframe. As one of the development risks peculiar 
to hydropower, the relatively long time for the arrangement of complex financial scheme is 
representative. [40] 
Both underground conditions and water volume belong to natural risks and must be recognizes as risks 
peculiar to hydropower, which are different form those of a thermal power plant. For the construction 
risks, there are large coal thermal power plants fully utilizing advanced environmental technologies, 
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and highly efficient plants using Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) as a result of developments of 
natural gas and expansion of its supply systems. These technologies for thermal power plants have 
been packaged and most of the productions processes are completed at factories in developed 
countries, with the result that only the installation is locally done. The quality control of thermal power 
plants is generally more standardized than that of hydropower plants for which a large portion of civil 
works is locally carried out. Therefore, conditions to realize the EPC turnkey of thermal power plants 
are more acceptable than that of hydropower plants. [41] 
During the operation period, the hydrological risk should be first point out for hydropower plants. 
While the supply of fuel to a thermal power plant is artificially made and fuel-suppliers are 
replaceable, the water inflow is under the control of nature and is not replaceable. That’s especially for 
run-of-river plants. In the case of reservoir, it has to be large enough to carry over for two or more 
years, so that hydrological fluctuations have little effect on the energy generation. [42] 
The market risks are for both the same. Peak-load energy can be delivered within less than a minute in 
the case of hydropower and in a few minutes in the case of thermal power plant. In this particularly 
case of peak-load energy needed very fast, the hydropower is in advantage. 
5. CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
5.1 Critical success factors for PPP in general 
The big question is “is the investment more or less 50 Mio US$”. Currently, most banks, which are asked 
for loan, have this 50 Mio US$ as barrier. Is the investment above 50 Mio US$, then: 
• development is expensive (big environmental impact study needed, specially for hydraulic projects) 
• the promoter needs 3-5 Mio US$ from the beginning to invest from his one even he isn’t sure to get 
the BOT-contract 
• in the practice, one takes projects which aren’t complicated, like a rehabilitation project, run-of-river 
hydraulic plants, … 
The critical success factors are: 
• negotiate the environmental issues, specially with the NGO 
• built very fast because investment is at the beginning (for example not have to much civil 
engineering works to do) 
• have the needed money for the whole investment and as promoter have financial resources to start 
promoting for the project and engaging funds even there is no certainty to get to project 
In the case of a project of less than 50 US$, the critical success factors are: 
• To find the fund. Most lenders don’t invest in project below 50 US$, because they don’t evaluate 
small projects. There are only few bilateral funds for project of this size. 
• To have the equity and experience the way you can still find lenders. 
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• To have guarantee on his own as promoter. For example: for a 10 Mio US$ project the promoter 
needs 8 Mio US$ loans, then he has to have guarantee in form of assets for example. One other 
possibility is to have a local bank who gave the guarantee because it knows the project and can 
supervise it. This local bank agrees to give a bank guarantee to a foreign bank, who gives the loan. 
In this case the financial risk stays at the local bank. 
5.2 Critical success factors for PPP thermal 
Pos: 
• more limited initial investment 
• construction time shorter (less “blocked” money in the time where there isn’t a revenue) (about 10 
months) 
• less complexity than hydraulic (doesn’t need big environmental impact study as hydraulic needs + 
construction time shorter => easier logistic) 
Neg: 
• is there a CO2-Tax 
• are there any contract for oil/gas (e.g. for 10 years with fixed prize) or one has to buy it on the 
market (volatility of the oil price) 
• fossil energy 
5.3 Critical success factors for PPP hydraulic 
Pos: 
• On the long-term it’s cheaper (cheap exploitation costs) 
• Long life (50 years for civil works and 25 years for the hydromechanics and electrical equipment) 
• No gas imitation 
• Fulfils far more sustainable development view 
Neg: 
• Bigger infrastructures: impact on environment 
• Very big initial investment (the highest project expenses usually occur during the construction phase) 
• Uncertainty on construction time and construction costs 
5.4 Relevant criteria for the choice between thermal and hydraulic 
• amount of kWh needed (is there enough hydraulic capacity? If not, the only thermal solution) 
• type of energy needed - continuous vs. peak-load (thermal: doesn’t matter; hydraulic: either 
reservoir possible (peak-load possible, then hydraulic projects are the best choice [43]) or run-of-
river (continuous possible) 
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• cost of the carburant (hydro: one need a concession for using the water; thermal: oil price!, or one 
has something a similar paper as the concession for water with fixed price) 
• regulatory factors (e.g., CO2 tax) 
• type of investment (long construction period possible?) 
• problems with NGO / population for a hydraulic plant => chose thermal plant 
• big doubts about the geology, hydrology and other sides factors => chose thermal plant 
• is there a sustainable development view 
Because the civil works part has the biggest weight in the hydraulic projects financing (60-80%) [44], 
for local economy, a hydraulic project is very important because of benefits that it assumes. Hydraulic 
projects may have multiple utilization (water supplies, irrigation, protection against floods, etc.), too, 
what represent an additional value to it. 
6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMANDATIONS 
• The main overall conclusion about PPP is that the record is quite mixed. While in general, the 
efficiency levels, quality and access rates have benefited from the reforms, the price grew up. 
• The state had a social goal to fulfill. With the change to PPP and the participation of private, the 
privates have an economic goal (maximize the profits). 
• The experience showed up that in the countries in which the energetic expansion has been based by 
economic principles “on the short term”, developed the capacities in the thermal power sector (on 
gas and coal) which have initial costs of capital lower and reduce terms of achievement than in the 
case of hydraulic. In addition, the longer the contract period time is, the more additional risks like 
demographic change or legislation changes come into the play. The developing on the short-term 
doesn’t take in consideration that after the period of the retrieval of the loan (12-15 years) the 
generated power in the hydraulic plants returns to 4-5 times lower price than of any comparable 
capacity from thermal.  
• The risk management is the key to success. The main issue is not to maximize the profit, but to be 
able to manage the risks. Risk should be allocated to the party who can best assume it in the most 
cost effective manner. For each party the personal network and experience with PPP bring an 
competitive advantages. 
• Risk profile of hydraulic and thermal: There are more risks for the hydraulic plants (geology, 
hydrology), but in the case of thermal there are risks on the raise of the fuel prize and a possible 
legislation about CO2. 
• Critical success factor for PPP in general is this 50 Mio US$ barrier.  
• The advantages of thermal plants are the more limited initial investment, a shorter construction time 
and less complexity. But it’s using fossil energy and its carburant is more under macroeconomics 
influence than in the case of hydraulic plants. Hydraulic plants present the advantages that in a 
long-term perspective, the cost per kWh is cheaper. 
• The whole subject of PPP as still to be developed to find solutions for the financing of the needed 
infrastructures in developing countries. Especially for hydraulic projects which are longer on the time 
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schedule and need more investment at the beginning, but fulfilled better the goal of sustainable 
development. 
• The problem of finding investors for infrastructures project with no as high interest rates. 
• There is no “type contract”. Each project is unique and has to be studied in its context (regulation, 
market, environment, …). But one constant for all PPP contract is that all identified risks have to be 
allocated to one party. 
• For BOT today, thermal works better. For hydraulic, especially for bigger infrastructures, new types 
of financing will have to be developed. 
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8. ANNEX 
8.1 Further cases 
 
 Dam and hydroelectric 
plant of Birecik, Turkey 
Dam and hydroelectric 
plant of Cana Brava, Brazil 
Dam and hydroelectric 
plant of Potrerillos, 
Argentina 
Capacity (MW) 672 MW 450 MW 105 MW 
Production a year (GWh) 3000 GWh 2396 GWh 750 GWh 
Start of construction April 1996  October 1996 
Start of operation October 2001 as planned May 2002 with the first 
production unity (6 months in 
advanced) 
June 2003 
Investment costs 1.3 Mia US$ 450 Mio US$ 255 Mio US$ 
Equity-debt distribution It’s cover by 14.5% by the 
concessionary company and 
by 82% by senior debt and 
by 3.5% by the revenue of 
the fist production unit until 
all production unit are in 
function. The senior debt is 
by 75% credits of buyer 
and this credits have a 
maturity of 10 years and 
have a prime of 0.5-1% 
additional to the interbank 
interest rate in application 
for 6 months. The other 25% 
of the senior debt are cover 
by commercial credits with a 
maturity of 12 years and 
have a prime of 2-3% 
additional to the interbank 
interest rate in application 
for 6 months. 
It’s covered by 30% by the 
private shareholders and by 
each 35% by the two banks 
BNDES (Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvomento Economico 
e Social) and BID (Banque 
Interaméricaine de 
Développement). Both debts 
have a maturity of 10 years. 
The BNDES credit has a 
prime of 1-2% additional to 
the interbank long-term 
interest rate TJLP. The BID 
credit has a prime of 3-4% 
additional to the interbank 
interest rate. 
It’s cover by 63.5% by the 
Province de Mendoza and 
by 36.5% by the 
concessionary company. 
Investment costs per MW 
installed 
1.9 Mio US$/MW 1 Mio US$/MW 2.4 Mio US$/MW 
Energy buyer The energy is sold to TEAS The energy is sold to the 
free market: long term PPAs 
with several distributors + 
spot market (secondary 
energy that is produced 
upon the guarantee amount 
can be sold on the spot 
market) 
The energy is sold to the 
market: long term PPAs with 
several distributors + spot 
market 
Type of contract BOT: Concessionary 
company of turkey right 
“Birecik Company” is owned 
by private national and 
foreign corporations (70% 
of the capital) and by 
national turkey company of 
electricity distribution TEAS 
(30% of the capital). 
Concession BOT: Concessionary 
Company of Argentinean 
right “CEMPPSA” is owned 
by two private national 
corporations 
Duration of concession 15 years starting from the 
operation time 
35 years (included the 
construction period) 
25 years starting from the 
operation time 
Additional comments Additional cost not includes 
in the Total Investment Costs 
-  Water for irrigation comes 
to from this dam. This water 
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like taxes, customs rights and 
the covering of certain risks 
are cover by an additional 
debt with was created by 
the turkey government to 
facilitate the private 
investment. 
The Concession giving 
Authority engages itself to 
help the concessionary 
company to get all 
administrative authorisations 
necessary for the project. 
All taxes for the corporations 
or theirs employees involved 
in the construction or 
exploitation are reduced to 
zero or taken by the 
concession giving Authority. 
All impacts (costs, delays, 
lost of revenue, etc. ) coming 
from a force majeure event 
or coming from a fault of the 
concession giving Authority 
are supported by the 
concession giving Authority. 
TEAS has the buy all the 
produced energy even there 
aren’t able to absorb it. 
The obligations of TEAS are 
guarantee by a guarantee 
of the State Tresory of 
Turkey (Trésor de l’Etat turc.) 
The tariff of the electricity is 
calculated the way that it 
assures a return on 
investment for the 
concessionary company. 
is free of charge. 
If the revenue of the sold 
energy during the concession 
period actualised by 14% is 
inferior to 120 Mio US$, the 
concessionary company has 
the right to obtain a 
concession prorogation of 5 
years and maximum to 40 
years in all. 
 
Source : International Commission on Large Dams BINQUET, J. DEVELAY, D. TARDIEU, B. Typologie et spécificités 
de quelques projets hydroélectriques développés en BOT, volume 1, report 5, Montreal, June 2003 
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8.2 Table of risks 
(Non exhaustive, taken from “Principles of project finance”, E.R. Yescombe, 2002) 
- Commercial risks (project risks): 
o Commercial viability: 
 Market (Client) 
 Price 
 Competition 
 ... 
 => market segment analysis 
o Completion risks (can the project be completed on time and on budget?): 
 Permits 
 Competence of contractor 
 ... 
o operating risks: 
 new technology 
 obsolescence 
 ... 
o revenue risks 
o input supply risks (can raw materials or other inputs be obtained at the projected 
costs?) 
o contract mismatch (do the project contracts fit together properly?) 
o sponsor support (is there a need for more recourse to the sponsors?) 
- Macro-economic risks (financial risks): relate to external economic effect not directly related to 
the project: 
o Inflation 
o Interest rate risks 
o Exchange rate risks 
 Devaluation 
 ... 
- Political risks (country risks): 
o Investment risks: 
 currency convertibility and transfer 
 expropriation of the project by the state 
 political violence (i.e. war und civil disturbance – also known as political force 
majeure) 
o Change of law risks 
o Quasi-political risks: 
 Breach of contract and court decisions 
 “sub-sovereign” risks (regional authority) 
 creeping expropriation (hidden complications such for obtaining permits, ...) 
- environmental risks 
o force majeure 
 
Comment:  Risk evaluation and allocation: one needs to have the right, reliable, available, significant 
information 
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